the power which clear and
distinct knowledge, and especially that third kind of knowledge whose
foundation is the knowledge itself of God, possesses over the emotions;
the power, namely, by which it is able, in so far as they are passions,
if not actually to destroy them, at least to make them constitute the
smallest part of the mind. Moreover, it begets a love towards an
immutable and eternal object of which we are really partakers; a love
which therefore cannot be vitiated by the defects which are in common
love, but which can always become greater and greater, occupy the
largest part of the mind, and thoroughly affect it.
I have now concluded all that I had to say relating to this present
life. For any one who will attend to what has been urged will easily be
able to see the truth of what I said--that in these few words all the
remedies for the emotions are comprehended. It is time, therefore, that
I should now pass to the consideration of those matters which appertain
to the duration of the mind without relation to the body.
CHAPTER XX
OF HUMAN BLESSEDNESS AND THE ETERNITY OF THE MIND
_Human Blessedness: The Intellectual Love of God_
I
The third kind of knowledge proceeds from an adequate idea of certain
attributes of God to an adequate knowledge of the essence of things; and
the more we understand things in this manner, the more we understand
God; and therefore the highest virtue of the mind, that is to say, the
power or nature of the mind, or the highest effort, is to understand
things by the third kind of knowledge.
The better the mind is adapted to understand things by the third kind of
knowledge, the more it desires to understand them by this kind of
knowledge.
The highest virtue of the mind is to know God, or to understand things
by the third kind of knowledge. This virtue is greater the more the mind
knows things by this kind of knowledge, and therefore he who knows
things by this kind of knowledge passes to the highest human perfection,
and consequently is affected with the highest joy, which is accompanied
with the idea of himself and his own virtue; and therefore from this
kind of knowledge arises the highest possible peace of mind.
The effort or the desire to know things by the third kind of knowledge
cannot arise from the first kind, but may arise from the second kind of
knowledge. This proposition is self-evident. For everything that we
clearly and distinctly understand, we u
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