iolation of natural
right, and the covenant can always be strictly kept--that is, if each
individual hands over the whole of his power to the body politic, the
latter will then possess sovereign natural right over all things; that
is, it will have sole and unquestioned dominion, and every one will be
bound to obey, under pain of the severest punishment. A body politic of
this kind is called a Democracy, which may be defined as a society which
wields all its power as a whole. The sovereign power is not restrained
by any laws, but every one is bound to obey it in all things; such is
the state of things implied when men either tacitly or expressly handed
over to it all their power of self-defense, or in other words, all their
right. For if they had wished to retain any right for themselves, they
ought to have taken precautions for its defense and preservation. As
they have not done so, and indeed could not have done so without
dividing and consequently ruining the state, they placed themselves
absolutely at the mercy of the sovereign power; and, therefore, having
acted (as we have shown) as reason and necessity demanded, they are
obliged to fulfill the commands of the sovereign power, however absurd
these may be, else they will be public enemies, and will act against
reason, which urges the preservation of the state as a primary duty. For
reason bids us choose the lesser of two evils.

Furthermore, this danger of submitting absolutely to the dominion and
will of another, is one which may be incurred with a light heart: for we
have shown that sovereigns only possess this right of imposing their
will, so long as they have the full power to enforce it. If such power
be lost their right to command is lost also, or lapses to those who have
assumed it and can keep it. Thus it is very rare for sovereigns to
impose thoroughly irrational commands, for they are bound to consult
their own interests, and retain their power by consulting the public
good and acting according to the dictates of reason, as Seneca says,
"_violenta imperia nemo continuit diu_." No one can long retain a
tyrant's sway.

In a democracy, irrational commands are still less to be feared: for it
is almost impossible that the majority of a people, especially if it be
a large one, should agree in an irrational design: and, moreover, the
basis and aim of a democracy is to avoid the desires as irrational, and
to bring men as far as possible under the control of reaso