tates would necessarily follow.

Hence, so long as a man acts in obedience to the laws of his rulers, he
in nowise contravenes his reason, for in obedience to reason he
transferred the right of controlling his actions from his own hands to
theirs. This doctrine we can confirm from actual custom, for in a
conference of great and small powers, schemes are seldom carried
unanimously, yet all unite in carrying out what is decided on, whether
they voted for or against. But I return to my proposition.

From the fundamental notions of a state, we have discovered how a man
may exercise free judgment without detriment to the supreme power: from
the same premises we can no less easily determine what opinions would be
seditious. Evidently those which by their very nature nullify the
compact by which the right of free action was ceded. For instance, a
man who holds that the supreme power has no rights over him, or that
promises ought not to be kept, or that every one should live as he
pleases, or other doctrines of this nature in direct opposition to the
above-mentioned contract, is seditious, not so much from his actual
opinions and judgment, as from the deeds which they involve; for he who
maintains such theories abrogates the contract which tacitly, or openly,
he made with his rulers. Other opinions which do not involve acts
violating the contract, such as revenge, anger, and the like, are not
seditious, unless it be in some corrupt state, where superstitious and
ambitious persons, unable to endure men of learning, are so popular with
the multitude that their word is more valued than the law.

However, I do not deny that there are some doctrines which, while they
are apparently only concerned with abstract truths and falsehoods, are
yet propounded and published with unworthy motives.... Reason should
nevertheless remain unshackled. If we hold to the principle that a man's
loyalty to the state should be judged, like his loyalty to God, from his
actions only--namely, from his charity towards his neighbors; we cannot
doubt that the best government will allow freedom of philosophical
speculation no less than of religious belief. I confess that from such
freedom inconveniences may sometimes arise, but what question was ever
settled so wisely than no abuses could possibly spring therefrom? He who
seeks to regulate everything by law is more likely to arouse vices than
to reform them. It is best to grant what cannot be abolished, even