al right to do so,
whether I was actuated by true and evident reason, or whether I was
actuated by mere opinion in thinking I had promised rashly; whether my
reasons were true or false, I should be in fear of a greater evil,
which, by the ordinance of Nature, I should strive to avoid by every
means in my power.

We may, therefore, conclude that a compact is only made valid by its
utility, without which it becomes null and void. It is therefore foolish
to ask a man to keep his faith with us forever, unless we also endeavor
that the violation of the compact we enter into shall involve for the
violator more harm than good. This consideration should have very great
weight in forming a state. However, if all men could be easily led by
reason alone, and could recognize what is best and most useful for a
state, there would be no one who would not forswear deceit, for every
one would keep most religiously to their compact in their desire for the
chief good, namely, the preservation of the state, and would cherish
good faith above all things as the shield and buckler of the
commonwealth. However, it is far from being the case that all men can
always be easily led by reason alone; every one is drawn away by his
pleasure, while avarice, ambition, envy, hatred, and the like so engross
the mind that reason has no place therein. Hence, though men make
promises with all the appearances of good faith, and agree that they
will keep to their engagement, no one can absolutely rely on another
man's promise unless there is something behind it. Every one has by
Nature a right to act deceitfully, and to break his compacts, unless he
be restrained by the hope of some greater good, or the fear of some
greater evil.

However, as we have shown that the natural right of the individual is
only limited by his power, it is clear that by transferring, either
willingly or under compulsion, this power into the hands of another, he
in so doing necessarily cedes also a part of his right; and, further,
that the sovereign right over all men belongs to him who has sovereign
power, wherewith he can compel men by force, or restrain them by threats
of the universally feared punishment of death. Such sovereign right he
will retain only so long as he can maintain his power of enforcing his
will; otherwise he will totter on his throne, and no one who is stronger
than he will be bound unwillingly to obey him.

In this manner a society can be formed without any v