complished it, he calls it perfect, and not only he, but
every one else who has really known or has believed that he has known
the mind and intention of the author of that work will call it perfect
too. For example, having seen some work (which I suppose to be as yet
not finished), if we know that the intention of the author of that work
is to build a house, we shall call the house imperfect; while, on the
other hand, we shall call it perfect as soon as we see the work has been
brought to the end which the author had determined for it. But if we see
any work such as we have never seen before, and if we do not know the
mind of the workman, we shall then not be able to say whether the work
is perfect or imperfect.
This seems to have been the first signification of these words; but
afterwards men began to form universal ideas, to think out for
themselves types of houses, buildings, castles, and to prefer some types
of things to others; and so it happened that each person called a thing
perfect which seemed to agree with the universal idea which he had
formed of that thing, and, on the other hand, he called a thing
imperfect which seemed to agree less with his typal conception,
although, according to the intention of the workman, it had been
entirely completed. This appears to be the only reason why the words
_perfect_ and _imperfect_ are commonly applied to natural objects which
are not made with human hands; for men are in the habit of forming, both
of natural as well as of artificial objects, universal ideas which they
regard as types of things, and which they think Nature has in view,
setting them before herself as types too; it being the common opinion
that she does nothing except for the sake of some end. When, therefore,
men see something done by Nature which does not altogether answer to
that typal conception which they have of the thing, they think that
Nature herself has failed or committed an error, and that she has left
the thing imperfect.
Thus we see that the custom of applying the words _perfect_ and
_imperfect_ to natural objects has arisen rather from prejudice than
from true knowledge of them. For we have shown that Nature does nothing
for the sake of an end, for that eternal and infinite Being whom we call
God or Nature acts by the same necessity by which He exists; for we have
shown that He acts by the same necessity of nature as that by which He
exists. The reason or cause, therefore, why God or Natu
|