eakness of our nature, so that we may
determine what reason can do and what it cannot do in governing our
emotions.

FOOTNOTES:

[29] Chapter Eight _ad fin._

CHAPTER XV

THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE MORAL LIFE

_Introductory_

I have briefly explained the causes of human impotence and want of
stability, and why men do not obey the dictates of reason. It remains
for me now to show what it is which reason prescribes to us, which
emotions agree with the rules of human reason, and which, on the
contrary, are opposed to these rules. Before, however, I begin to
demonstrate these things by our full method, I should like briefly to
set forth here these dictates of reason, in order that what I have in my
mind about them may be easily comprehended by all.

Since reason demands nothing which is opposed to Nature, it demands,
therefore, that every person should love himself, should seek his own
profit--what is truly profitable to him--should desire everything that
really leads man to greater perfection, and absolutely that every one
should endeavor, as far as in him lies, to preserve his own being. This
is all true as necessarily as that the whole is greater than its part.
Again, since virtue means nothing but acting according to the laws of
our own nature, and since no one endeavors to preserve his being except
in accordance with the laws of his own nature, it follows: _Firstly_,
That the foundation of virtue is that endeavor itself to preserve our
own being, and that happiness consists in this--that a man can preserve
his own being. _Secondly_, It follows that virtue is to be desired for
its own sake, nor is there anything more excellent or more useful to us
than virtue, for the sake of which virtue ought to be desired.
_Thirdly_, It follows that all persons who kill themselves are impotent
in mind, and have been thoroughly overcome by external causes opposed to
their nature.

Again, we can never free ourselves from the need of something outside us
for the preservation of our being, and we can never live in such a
manner as to have no intercourse with objects which are outside us.
Indeed, so far as the mind is concerned, our intellect would be less
perfect if the mind were alone, and understood nothing but itself. There
are many things, therefore, outside us which are useful to us, and
which, therefore, are to be sought. Of all these, none more excellent
can be discovered than those which exactly agree with our natu