he despondent man arises
from his judging his own impotence by the power of virtue of others, his
sorrow will be mitigated, that is to say, he will rejoice, if his
imagination be occupied in contemplating the vices of others. Hence the
proverb-- It is a consolation to the wretched to have bad companions in
their misfortunes. On the other hand, the more the despondent man
believes himself to be below other people, the more will he sorrow; and
this is the reason why none are more prone to envy than the despondent;
and why they, above all others, try to observe men's actions with a view
to finding fault with them rather than correcting them, so that at last
they praise nothing but despondency and glory in it; but in such a
manner, however, as always to seem despondent.

These things follow from this emotion as necessarily as it follows from
the nature of a triangle that its three angles are equal to two right
angles. It is true, indeed, that I have said that I call these and the
like emotions evil, in so far as I attend to human profit alone; but the
laws of Nature have regard to the common order of Nature of which man
is a part--a remark I desired to make in passing, lest it should be
thought that I talk about the vices and absurdities of men rather than
attempt to demonstrate the nature and properties of things. As I said, I
consider human emotions and their properties precisely as I consider
other natural objects; and, indeed, the emotions of man, if they do not
show his power, show at least the power and workmanship of Nature, no
less than many other things which we admire and delight to contemplate.

VII

_Reasonable Emotions_

If we live according to the guidance of reason, we shall desire for
others the good which we seek for ourselves. Therefore if we see one
person do good to another, our endeavor to do good is assisted, that is
to say, we shall rejoice, and our joy (by hypothesis) will be
accompanied with the idea of the person who does good to the other, that
is to say, we shall favor him. Favor is not opposed to reason, but
agrees with it, and may arise from it.

Indignation, as it is defined by us, is necessarily evil; but it is to
be observed that when the supreme authority, constrained by the desire
of preserving peace, punishes a citizen who injures another, I do not
say that it is indignant with the citizen, since it is not excited by
hatred to destroy him, but punishes him from motives of piety.