mage of any other object which posits the existence of the first,
but, on the contrary (by hypothesis), we imagine some things which
exclude its present existence. But in so far as we imagine any object in
the future to be possible do we imagine some things which posit its
existence, that is to say, things which foster hope or fear, and
therefore the emotion towards an object which we know does not exist in
the present, and which we imagine as possible, other things being equal,
is stronger than the emotion towards a contingent object.

The emotion towards an object which we imagine to exist in the present
is stronger than if we imagined it as future, and is much stronger if we
imagine the future to be at a great distance from the present time. The
emotion, therefore, towards an object which we imagine will not exist
for a long time is so much feebler than if we imagined it as present,
and nevertheless is stronger than if we imagined it as contingent; and
therefore the emotion towards a contingent object is much feebler than
if we imagined the object to be present to us.

In so far as we imagine an object as contingent, we are affected with no
image of any other object which posits the existence of the first. On
the contrary, we imagine (by hypothesis) certain things which exclude
its present existence. But in so far as we imagine it in relationship to
past time are we supposed to imagine something which brings it back to
the memory or which excites its image and therefore so far causes us to
contemplate it as present. Therefore, the emotion towards a contingent
object which we know does not exist in the present, other things being
equal, will be weaker than the emotion towards a past object.

In these propositions I consider that I have explained why men are more
strongly influenced by an opinion than by true reason, and why the true
knowledge of good and evil causes disturbance in the mind, and often
gives way to every kind of lust, whence the saying of the poet, "_Video
meliora proboque, deteriora sequor._" The same thought appears to have
been in the mind of the Preacher when he said, "_He that increaseth
knowledge increaseth sorrow._" I say these things not because I would be
understood to conclude, therefore, that it is better to be ignorant than
to be wise, or that the wise man in governing his passions is nothing
better than the fool, but I say them because it is necessary for us to
know both the strength and w