he is endowed with so
weak a nature that he cannot check or moderate his desires. For the
nature of each thing is only competent to do that which follows
necessarily from its given cause.

That every man cannot be brave, and that we can no more command for
ourselves a healthy body than a healthy mind, nobody can deny, without
giving the lie to experience, as well as to reason. "But," you urge, "if
men sin by nature, they are excusable"; but you do not state the
conclusion you draw, whether that God cannot be angry with them, or that
they are worthy of blessedness--that is, of the knowledge and love of
God. If you say the former, I fully admit that God cannot be angry, and
that all things are done in accordance with His will; but I deny that
all men ought, therefore, to be blessed--men may be excusable, and
nevertheless, be without blessedness and afflicted in many ways.[25] A
horse is excusable for being a horse and not a man; but, nevertheless,
he must needs be a horse and not a man. He who goes mad from the bite of
a dog is excusable, yet he is rightly suffocated. Lastly, he who cannot
govern his desires, and keep them in check with the fear of the laws,
though his weakness may be excusable, yet he cannot enjoy with
contentment, the knowledge and love of God, but necessarily perishes.

FOOTNOTES:

[19] ... I say that a thing is free, which exists and acts solely by the
necessity of its own nature. Thus also God understands Himself and all
things freely, because it follows solely from the necessity of His
nature that He should understand all things. You see I do not place
freedom in free decision, but in free necessity. However, let us descend
to created things, which are all determined by external causes to exist
and operate in a given determinate manner. In order that this may be
clearly understood, let us conceive a very simple thing. For instance, a
stone receives from the impulsion of an external cause a certain
quantity of motion, by virtue of which it continues to move after the
impulsion given by the external cause has ceased. The permanence of the
stone's motion is constrained, not necessary because it must be defined
by the impulsion of an external cause. What is true of the stone is true
of an individual, however complicated its nature, or varied its
functions, inasmuch as every individual thing is necessarily determined
by some external cause to exist and operate in a fixed and determinate
manner.

Fu