notice them, because they belong to the body alone
without any relationship to the mind.

FOOTNOTES:

[26] Hence it follows that the mind is subject to passions in proportion
to the number of inadequate ideas which it has, and that it acts in
proportion to the number of adequate ideas which it has.

[27] This proposition is self-evident, for the definition of any given
thing affirms and does not deny the existence of the thing; that is to
say, it posits the essence of the thing and does not negate it. So long,
therefore, as we attend only to the thing itself, and not to external
causes, we shall discover nothing in it which can destroy it.

CHAPTER XIII

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE EMOTIONS

_The Association of the Emotions_

If the human body has at any time been simultaneously affected by two
bodies, whenever the mind afterwards imagines one of them, it will
immediately remember the other. But the imaginations of the mind
indicate rather the modifications of our body than the nature of
external bodies, and therefore if the body, and consequently the mind,
has been at any time, simultaneously affected by two emotions, whenever
it is afterwards affected by one of them, it will also be affected by
the other.

Let the mind be supposed to be affected at the same time by two
emotions, its power of action not being increased or diminished by one,
while it is increased or diminished by the other. From the preceding
proposition it is plain that when the mind is afterwards affected by the
first emotion through its true cause, which (by hypothesis) of itself
neither increases nor diminishes the mind's power of thinking, it will
at the same time be affected by the other emotion, which does increase
or diminish that power, that is to say, it will be affected with joy or
sorrow; and thus the thing itself will be the cause of joy or of sorrow,
not of itself, but accidentally. In the same way it can easily be shown
that the same thing may accidentally be the cause of desire.

The fact that we have contemplated a thing with an emotion of joy or
sorrow, of which it is not the efficient cause, is a sufficient reason
for being able to love or hate it.

We now understand why we love or hate certain things from no cause which
is known to us, but merely from sympathy or antipathy, as they say. To
this class, too, are to be referred those objects which affect us with
joy or sorrow solely because they are somewhat like objects