g anything to which we imagine men are averse.

He who imagines that he affects others with joy or sorrow will
necessarily be affected with joy or sorrow. But since man is conscious
of himself by means of the emotions by which he is determined to act;
therefore if a person has done anything which he imagines will affect
others with joy, he also will be affected with joy, accompanied with an
idea of himself as its cause; that is to say, he will look upon himself
with joy. If, on the other hand, he has done anything which he imagines
will affect others with sorrow, he will look upon himself with sorrow.

If we imagine that a person loves, desires, or hates a thing which we
ourselves love, desire, or hate, we shall on that account love, desire,
or hate the thing more steadily. If, on the other hand, we imagine that
he is averse to the thing we love or loves the thing to which we are
averse, we shall then suffer vacillation of mind.

It follows from this proposition that every one endeavors as much as
possible to make others love what he loves, and to hate what he hates.
Hence the poet says:

Speremus pariter, pariter metuamus amantes;
Ferreus est, si quis, quod sinit alter, amat.

This effort to make every one approve what we love or hate is in truth
ambition, and so we see that each person by nature desires that other
persons should live according to his way of thinking; but if every one
does this, then all are a hindrance to one another, and if every one
wishes to be praised or beloved by the rest, then they all hate one
another.

_The Varieties of Emotion_

Joy and sorrow, and consequently the emotions which are compounded of
these or derived from them, are passions. But we necessarily suffer in
so far as we have inadequate ideas, and only in so far as we have them;
that is to say, we necessarily suffer only in so far as we imagine, or
in so far as we are affected by a modification which involves the nature
of our body and that of an external body. The nature, therefore, of each
passion must necessarily be explained in such a manner, that the nature
of the object by which we are affected is expressed. The joy, for
example, which springs from an object _A_ involves the nature of that
object _A_, and the joy which springs from _B_ involves the nature of
that object _B_, and therefore these two emotions of joy are of a
different nature, because they arise from causes of a different nature.
In like manner