which
usually affect us with those emotions. I know indeed that the writers
who first introduced the words "Sympathy" and "Antipathy" desired
thereby to signify certain hidden qualities of things, but nevertheless
I believe that we shall be permitted to understand by those names
qualities which are plain and well known.

Anything may be accidentally the cause either of hope or fear. Things
which are accidentally the causes either of hope or fear are called good
or evil omens. In so far as the omens are the cause of hope and fear are
they the cause of joy or of sorrow, and consequently so far do we love
them or hate them, and endeavor to use them as means to obtain those
things for which we hope, or to remove them as obstacles or causes of
fear. Our natural constitution, too, is such that we easily believe the
things we hope for, and believe with difficulty those we fear, and we
think too much of the former and too little of the latter. Thus have
superstitions arisen, by which men are everywhere disquieted. I do not
consider it worth while to go any further, and to explain here all
those vacillations of mind which arise from hope and fear, since it
follows from the definition alone of these emotions that hope cannot
exist without fear, nor fear without hope.

If we imagine a certain thing to possess something which resembles an
object which usually affects the mind with joy or sorrow, although the
quality in which the thing resembles the object is not the efficient
cause of these emotions, we shall nevertheless, by virtue of the
resemblance alone, love or hate the thing.

If we have been affected with joy or sorrow by any one who belongs to a
class or nation different from our own, and if our joy or sorrow is
accompanied with the idea of this person as its cause, under the common
name of his class or nation, we shall not love or hate him merely, but
the whole of the class or nation to which he belongs.

_The Imitation and Reciprocation of the Emotions_

I

The images of things are modifications of the human body, and the ideas
of these modifications represent to us external bodies as if they were
present, that is to say, these ideas involve both the nature of our own
body and at the same time the present nature of the external body. If,
therefore, the nature of the external body be like that of our body,
then the idea of the external body which we imagine will involve a
modification of our body like that of the