ow, with the accompanying idea of some action which
we imagine people blame.
_Explanation._--A difference, however, is here to be observed between
shame and modesty. Shame is sorrow which follows a deed of which we are
ashamed. Modesty is the dread or fear of shame, which keeps a man from
committing any disgraceful act. To modesty is usually opposed impudence,
which indeed is not an emotion, as I shall show in the proper place; but
the names of emotions, as I have already said, are matters rather of
custom than indications of the nature of the emotions. I have thus
discharged the task which I set myself of explaining the emotions of
joy and sorrow. I will advance now to those which I ascribe to desire.
XXXII. _Regret_ is the desire or longing to possess something, the
emotion being strengthened by the memory of the object itself, and at
the same time being restrained by the memory of other things which
exclude the existence of the desired object.
_Explanation._--Whenever we recollect a thing, as we have often said, we
are thereby necessarily disposed to contemplate it with the same emotion
as if it were present before us. But this disposition or effort, while
we are awake, is generally restrained by the images of things which
exclude the existence of the thing which we recollect. Whenever,
therefore, we recollect a thing which affects us with any kind of joy,
we thereby endeavor to contemplate it with the same emotion of joy as if
it were present,--an attempt which is, however, immediately restrained
by the memory of that which excludes the existence of the thing. Regret,
therefore, is really a sorrow which is opposed to the joy which arises
from the absence of what we hate. But because the name _regret_ seems to
connect this emotion with desire, I therefore ascribe it to desire.
XXXIII. _Emulation_ is the desire which is begotten in us of a thing
because we imagine that other persons have the same desire.
_Explanation._--He who seeks flight because others seek it, he who fears
because he sees others fear, or even he who withdraws his hand and moves
his body as if his hand were burning because he sees that another person
has burnt his hand, such as these, I say, although they may indeed
imitate the emotion of another, are not said to emulate it; not because
we have recognized one cause for emulation and another for imitation,
but because it has been the custom to call that man only emulous who
imitates what we
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