hings, but
merely from the absence of any cause by which from the contemplation of
one thing the mind is determined to think other things. I acknowledge,
therefore, only three primitive or primary emotions, those of joy,
sorrow, and desire; and the only reason which has induced me to speak
of astonishment is, that it has been the custom to give other names to
certain emotions derived from the three primitives whenever these
emotions are related to objects at which we are astonished. This same
reason also induces me to add the definition of contempt.

V. _Contempt_ is the imagination of an object which so little touches
the mind that the mind is moved by the presence of the object to imagine
those qualities which are not in it rather than those which are in it.

The definitions of veneration and scorn I pass by here, because they
give a name, so far as I know, to none of the emotions.

VI. _Love_ is joy with the accompanying idea of an external cause.

_Explanation._--This definition explains with sufficient clearness the
essence of love; that which is given by some authors, who define love to
be the will of the lover to unite himself to the beloved object,
expresses not the essence of love but one of its properties. In as much
as these authors have not seen with sufficient clearness what is the
essence of love, they could not have a distinct conception of its
properties, and consequently their definition has by everybody been
thought very obscure. I must observe, however, when I say that it is a
property in a lover to will a union with the beloved object, that I do
not understand by will a consent or deliberation or a free decree of the
mind (for that this is a fiction we have demonstrated above), nor even a
desire of the lover to unite himself with the beloved object when it is
absent, nor a desire to continue in its presence when it is present, for
love can be conceived without either one or the other of these desires;
but by will I understand the satisfaction that the beloved object
produces in the lover by its presence, by virtue of which the joy of the
lover is strengthened, or at any rate supported.

VII. _Hatred_ is sorrow with the accompanying idea of an external cause.

_Explanation._--What is to be observed here will easily be seen from
what has been said in the explanation of the preceding definition.

VIII. _Inclination_ (_propensio_) is a joy with the accompanying idea of
some object as being accident