ssence, whether it be innate, whether it be
conceived through the attribute of thought alone or of extension alone,
or whether it be related to both. By the word "desire," therefore, I
understand all the efforts, impulses, appetites, and volitions of a man,
which vary according to his changing disposition, and not unfrequently
are so opposed to one another that he is drawn hither and thither, and
knows not whither he ought to turn.

II. _Joy_ is man's passage from a less to a greater perfection.

III. _Sorrow_ is man's passage from a greater to a less perfection.

_Explanation._--I say passage, for joy is not perfection itself. If a
man were born with the perfection to which he passes, he would possess
it without the emotion of joy; a truth which will appear the more
clearly from the emotion of sorrow, which is the opposite to joy. For
that sorrow consists in the passage to a less perfection, but not in the
less perfection itself, no one can deny, since in so far as a man shares
any perfection he cannot be sad. Nor can we say that sorrow consists in
the privation of a greater perfection for privation is nothing. But the
emotion of sorrow is a reality, and it therefore must be the reality of
the passage to a lesser perfection, or the reality by which man's power
of acting is diminished or limited. As for the definitions of
cheerfulness, pleasurable excitement, melancholy, and grief, I pass
these by, because they are related rather to the body than to the mind,
and are merely different kinds of joy or of sorrow.

IV. _Astonishment_ is the imagination of an object in which the mind
remains fixed because this particular imagination has no connection with
others.

_Explanation._--That which causes the mind from the contemplation of one
thing immediately to pass to the thought of another is that the images
of these things are connected one with the other, and are so arranged
that the one follows the other; a process which cannot be conceived when
the image of the thing is new, for the mind will be held in the
contemplation of the same object until other causes determine it to
think of other things. The imagination, therefore, considered in itself,
of a new object is of the same character as other imaginations; and for
this reason I do not class astonishment among the emotions, nor do I see
any reason why I should do it, since this abstraction of the mind arises
from no positive cause by which it is abstracted from other t