ally the cause of joy.

IX. _Aversion_ is sorrow with the accompanying idea of some object which
is accidentally the cause of the sorrow.

X. _Devotion_ is love towards an object which astonishes us.

_Explanation._--Astonishment arises from the novelty of the object. If,
therefore, it should happen that we often imagine the object at which we
are astonished, we shall cease to be astonished at it, and hence we see
that the emotion of devotion easily degenerates into simple love.

XI. _Derision_ is joy arising from the imagination that something we
despise is present in an object we hate.

_Explanation._--In so far as we despise a thing we hate do we deny its
existence, and so far do we rejoice. But inasmuch as we suppose that a
man hates what he ridicules, it follows that this joy is not solid.

XII. _Hope_ is a joy not constant, arising from the idea of something
future or past, about the issue of which we sometimes doubt.

XIII. _Fear_ is a sorrow not constant, arising from the idea of
something future or past, about the issue of which we sometimes doubt.

_Explanation._--From these definitions it follows that there is no hope
without fear nor fear without hope, for the person who wavers in hope
and doubts concerning the issue of anything is supposed to imagine
something which may exclude its existence, and so far, therefore, to be
sad, and consequently while he wavers in hope, to fear lest his wishes
should not be accomplished. So also the person who fears, that is to
say, who doubts whether what he hates will not come to pass, imagines
something which excludes the existence of what he hates, and therefore
is rejoiced, and consequently so far hopes that it will not happen.

XIV. _Confidence_ is joy arising from the idea of a past or future
object from which cause for doubting is removed.

XV. _Despair_ is sorrow arising from the idea of a past or future object
from which cause for doubting is removed.

_Explanation._--Confidence, therefore, springs from hope and despair
from fear, whenever the reason for doubting the issue is taken away; a
case which occurs either because we imagine a thing past or future to be
present and contemplate it as present, or because we imagine other
things which exclude the existence of those which made us to doubt.

For although we can never be sure about the issue of individual objects,
it may nevertheless happen that we do not doubt it. For elsewhere we
have shown that it is