use. Our mind,
therefore, in so far as it has adequate ideas, necessarily at times
acts. Again, if there be anything which necessarily follows from an idea
which is adequate in God, not in so far as He contains within Himself
the mind of one man only, but also, together with this, the ideas[26]
of other things, then the mind of that man is not the adequate cause of
that thing, but is only its partial cause, and therefore, in so far as
the mind has inadequate ideas, it necessarily at times suffers.
_The Basic Endeavor of All Things_
Individual things are modes by which the attributes of God are expressed
in a certain and determinate manner; that is to say, they are things
which express in a certain and determinate manner the power of God, by
which He is and acts. A thing, too, has nothing in itself through which
it can be destroyed, or which can negate its existence,[27] but, on the
contrary, it is opposed to everything which could negate its existence.
Therefore, in so far as it can and is in itself, it endeavors to
persevere in its own being.
_The Three Primary Emotions_
I
_Desire_
The essence of the mind is composed of adequate and inadequate ideas (as
we have shown), and therefore both in so far as it has the former and in
so far as it has the latter, it endeavors to persevere in its being,
and endeavors to persevere in it for an indefinite time. But since the
mind, through the ideas of the modifications of the body, is necessarily
conscious of itself, it is therefore conscious of its effort.
This effort, when it is related to the mind alone, is called _will_, but
when it is related at the same time both to the mind and the body, is
called _appetite_, which is therefore nothing but the very essence of
man, from the nature of which necessarily follow those things which
promote his preservation, and thus he is determined to do those things.
Hence there is no difference between appetite and desire, unless in this
particular, that desire is generally related to men in so far as they
are conscious of their appetites, and it may therefore be defined as
appetite of which we are conscious. From what has been said it is plain,
therefore, that we neither strive for, wish, seek, nor desire anything
because we think it to be good, but, on the contrary, we adjudge a thing
to be good because we strive for, wish, seek, or desire it.
II
_Joy and Sorrow_
If anything increases, diminishes, helps, or limits
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