rther conceive, I beg, that a stone, while continuing in motion,
should be capable of thinking and knowing, that it is endeavoring, as
far as it can, to continue to move. Such a stone, being conscious merely
of its own endeavor and not at all indifferent, would believe itself to
be completely free, and would think that it continued in motion solely
because of its own wish. This is that human freedom, which all boast
that they possess, and which consists solely in the fact, that men are
conscious of their own desire, but are ignorant of the causes whereby
that desire has been determined.[20] ...

[20] _From a letter to G. H. Schaller_ (1674).

[21] _From a letter to Henry Oldenburg_ (Dec., 1675).

[22] The _Ethics_.--ED.

[23] I received on Saturday last your very short letter dated 15th Nov.
In it you merely indicated the points in the theological treatise which
have given pain to readers, whereas I had hoped to learn from it what
were the opinions which militated against the practice of religious
virtue.... I make this chief distinction between religion and
superstition; the latter is founded on ignorance, the former on
knowledge. This, I take it, is the reason why Christians are
distinguished from the rest of the world, not by faith, nor by charity,
nor by the other fruits of the Holy Spirit, but solely by their
opinions, inasmuch as they defend their cause, like every one else, by
miracles, that is, by ignorance, which is the source of all malice. Thus
they turn a faith, which may be true, into superstition. _From a letter
to Henry Oldenburg_ (Dec., 1675).

[24] _From a letter to Henry Oldenburg_ (Feb. 7, 1676).

[25] A mouse no less than an angel, and sorrow no less than joy depend
on God; yet a mouse is not a kind of angel, neither is sorrow a kind of
joy. _From a letter to Wm. Blyenbergh_ (March 13, 1665).

CHAPTER XII

THE ORIGIN AND NATURE OF THE EMOTIONS

_Introductory_

Most persons who have written about the emotions and man's conduct of
life seem to discuss, not the natural things which follow the common
laws of Nature, but things which are outside her. They seem indeed to
consider man in Nature as a kingdom within a kingdom. For they believe
that man disturbs rather than follows her order; that he has an absolute
power over his own actions; and that he is altogether self-determined.
They then proceed to attribute the cause of human weakness and
changeableness, not to the common power of