does not perceive the thing
adequately. The suspension of the judgment, therefore, is in truth a
perception and not free will.
In order that this may be clearly understood, let us take the case of a
boy who imagines a horse and perceives nothing else. Since this
imagination involves the existence of the horse, and the boy does not
perceive anything which negates its existence, he will necessarily
contemplate it as present, nor will he be able to doubt its existence
although he may not be certain of it. This is a thing which we daily
experience in dreams, nor do I believe that there is any one who thinks
that he has the free power during dreams of suspending his judgment upon
those things which he dreams, and of causing himself not to dream those
things which he dreams that he sees; and yet in dreams it nevertheless
happens that we suspend our judgment, for we dream that we dream.
I grant, it is true, that no man is deceived in so far as he perceives;
that is to say, I grant that mental images considered in themselves
involve no error; but I deny that a man in so far as he perceives
affirms nothing. For what else is it to perceive a winged horse than to
affirm of the horse that it has wings? For if the mind perceived nothing
else but this winged horse, it would regard it as present, nor would it
have any reason for doubting its existence, nor any power of refusing
assent to it, unless the image of the winged horse be joined to an idea
which negates its existence, or the mind perceives that the idea of the
winged horse which it has is inadequate. In either of the two latter
cases it will necessarily deny or doubt the existence of the horse.
With regard to the third objection, what has been said will perhaps be
a sufficient answer--namely, that the will is something universal, which
is predicated of all ideas, and that it signifies that only which is
common to them all, that is to say, affirmation. Its adequate essence,
therefore, in so far as it is thus considered in the abstract, must be
in every idea, and in this sense only must it be the same in all; but
not in so far as it is considered as constituting the essence of an
idea, for so far, the individual affirmations differ just as the ideas
differ. For example, the affirmation which the idea of a circle involves
differs from that which the idea of a triangle involves, just as the
idea of a circle differs from the idea of a triangle. Again, I
absolutely deny that
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