thought, is not an image of anything, nor does it
consist of words. For the essence of words and images is formed of
bodily motions alone, which involve in no way whatever the conception of
thought.
Let thus much suffice under this head. I pass on now to the objections
to which I have already alluded.
_Freedom of the Will_
The first is, that it is supposed to be certain that the will extends
itself more widely than the intellect, and is therefore different from
it. The reason why men suppose that the will extends itself more widely
than the intellect is because they say they have discovered that they do
not need a larger faculty of assent--that is to say, of affirmation--and
denial than that which they now have for the purpose of assenting to an
infinite number of other things which we do not perceive, but that they
do need a greater faculty for understanding them. The will, therefore,
is distinguished from the intellect, the latter being finite, the former
infinite. The second objection which can be made is that there is
nothing which experience seems to teach more clearly than the
possibility of suspending our judgment, so as not to assent to the
things we perceive; and we are strengthened in this opinion because no
one is said to be deceived in so far as he perceives a thing, but only
in so far as he assents to it or dissents from it. For example, a man
who imagines a winged horse does not therefore admit the existence of a
winged horse; that is to say, he is not necessarily deceived, unless he
grants at the same time that a winged horse exists. Experience,
therefore, seems to show nothing more plainly than that the will or
faculty of assent is free, and different from the faculty of the
intellect.
Thirdly, it may be objected that one affirmation does not seem to
contain more reality than another; that is to say, it does not appear
that we need a greater power for affirming a thing to be true which is
true than for affirming a thing to be true which is false. Nevertheless,
we observe that one idea contains more reality or perfection than
another, for as some objects are nobler than others, in the same
proportion are their ideas more perfect. It appears indisputable,
therefore, that there is a difference between the will and the
intellect.
Fourthly, it may be objected that if a man does not act from freedom of
the will, what would he do if he were in a state of equilibrium, like
the ass of Buridanus? Wo
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