equence, represented Clarke as arguing from the existence of time
and space to the existence of Deity. This is a serious mistake. The
existence of an immutable, independent, and necessary being is
supposed to be proved before any reference is made to the nature of
time and space. Clarke has been generally supposed to have derived the
opinion that time and space are attributes of an infinite immaterial
and spiritual being from the _Scholium Generale_, first published in
the second edition of Newton's _Principia_ (1714). The truth is that
his work on the Being and Attributes of God appeared nine years before
that _Scholium_. The view propounded by Clarke may have been derived
from the Midrash, the Kabbalah, Philo, Henry More, or Cudworth, but
not from Newton. It is a view difficult to prove, and probably few
will acknowledge that Clarke has conclusively proved it.

His ethical theory of "fitness" (see ETHICS) is formulated on the
analogy of mathematics. He held that in relation to the will things
possess an objective fitness similar to the mutual consistency of
things in the physical universe. This fitness God has given to
actions, as he has given laws to Nature; and the fitness is as
immutable as the laws. The theory has been unfairly criticized by
Jouffroy, Amedee Jacques, Sir James Mackintosh, Thomas Brown and
others. It is said, for example, that Clarke made virtue consist in
conformity to the relations of things universally, although the whole
tenor of his argument shows him to have had in view conformity to such
relations only as belong to the sphere of moral agency. It is true
that he might have emphasized the relation of moral fitness to the
will, and in this respect J.F. Herbart (_q.v._) improved on Clarke's
statement of the case. To say, however, that Clarke simply confused
mathematics and morals by justifying the moral criterion on a
mathematical basis is a mistake. He compared the two subjects for the
sake of the analogy.

Though Clarke can thus be defended against this and similar criticism,
his work as a whole can be regarded only as an attempt to present the
doctrines of the Cartesian school in a form which would not shock the
conscience of his time. His work contained a measure of rationalism
sufficient to arouse the suspicion of orthodox theologians, without
making any valuable addition to, or modification of, the underlying
doctrine