remember," quoth I, "that that also was proved." "Dost
thou also call to mind that blessedness is goodness itself, and
consequently when blessedness is sought after, goodness must of course
be desired?" "I call it not to mind, for I have it already fixed in my
memory." "Wherefore all men both good and bad without difference of
intentions endeavour to obtain goodness." "It followeth," quoth I. "But
it is certain that men are made good by the obtaining of goodness." "It
is so." "Wherefore good men obtain what they desire." "So it seemeth."
"And if evil men did obtain the goodness they desire, they could not be
evil." "It is true." "Wherefore since they both desire goodness, but the
one obtaineth it and the other not, there is no doubt but that good men
are powerful, and the evil weak." "Whosoever doubteth of this," quoth I,
"he neither considereth the nature of things, nor the consequence of thy
reasons." "Again," quoth she, "if there be two to whom the same thing is
proposed according to nature, and the one of them bringeth it perfectly
to pass with his natural function, but the other cannot exercise that
natural function but after another manner than is agreeable to nature,
and doth not perform that which he had proposed, but imitateth the other
who performeth it: which of these two wilt thou judge to be more
powerful?" "Though I conjecture," quoth I, "at thy meaning, yet I desire
to hear it more plainly." "Wilt thou deny," quoth she, "that the motion
of walking is agreeable to the nature of men?" "No," quoth I. "And
makest thou any doubt that the function of it doth naturally belong to
the feet?" "There is no doubt of this neither," quoth I. "Wherefore if
one that can go upon his feet doth walk, and another who hath not this
natural function of his feet endeavoureth to walk by creeping upon his
hands, which of these two is deservedly to be esteemed the stronger?"
"Infer the rest," quoth I, "for no man doubteth but that he which can
use that natural function is stronger than he which cannot." "But,"
quoth she, "the good seek to obtain the chiefest good, which is equally
proposed to bad and good, by the natural function of virtues, but the
evil endeavour to obtain the same by divers concupiscences, which are
not the natural function of obtaining goodness. Thinkest thou
otherwise?" "No," quoth I, "for it is manifest what followeth. For by
the force of that w
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