ard shape of men, are
in their inward state of mind changed into brute beasts. But I would
have had them whose cruel and wicked heart rageth to the harm of the
good, restrained from executing their malice." "They are restrained,"
quoth she, "as shall be proved in convenient place. But yet if this
liberty which they seem to have be taken away, their punishment also is
in great part released. For (which perhaps to some may seem incredible)
evil men must necessarily be more unhappy when they have brought to pass
their purposes than if they could not obtain what they desire. For if it
be a miserable thing to desire that which is evil, it is more miserable
to be able to perform it, without which the miserable will could not
have any effect. Wherefore since everyone of these hath their peculiar
misery, they must of force be oppressed with a threefold wretchedness,
whom thou seest desire, be able, and perform wickedness." "I grant it,"
quoth I, "but earnestly wish that they may soon be delivered from this
misery, having lost the power to perform their malice." "They will lose
it," quoth she, "sooner than perhaps either thou wouldst, or they
themselves suppose. For in the short compass of this life there is
nothing so late that any one, least of all an immortal soul, should
think it long in coming; so that the great hope and highest attempts of
the wicked are many times made frustrate with a sudden and unexpected
end, which in truth setteth some end to their misery.

For if wickedness make men miserable, the longer one is wicked, the more
miserable he must needs be; and I should judge them the most unhappy men
that may be, if death at least did not end their malice. For if we have
concluded truly of the misery of wickedness, it is manifest that the
wretchedness which is everlasting must of force be infinite." "A strange
illation," quoth I, "and hard to be granted; but I see that those things
which were granted before agree very well with these." "Thou thinkest
aright," quoth she, "but he that findeth difficulty to yield to the
conclusion must either show that something which is presupposed is
false, or that the combination of the propositions makes not a necessary
conclusion; otherwise, granting that which went before, he hath no
reason to doubt of the inference. For this also which I will conclude
now will seem no less strange, and yet followeth as necessarily o