er? Those things also which are thought to be
without all life, doth not every one in like manner desire that which
appertaineth to their own good? For why doth levity lift up flames, or
heaviness weigh down the earth, but because these places and motions are
convenient for them? And that which is agreeable to everything
conserveth it, as that which is opposite causeth corruption. Likewise
those things which are hard, as stones, stick most firmly to their
parts, and make great resistance to any dissolution. And liquid things,
as air and water, are indeed easily divided, but do easily also join
again. And fire flieth all division. Neither do we now treat of the
voluntary motions of the understanding soul, but only of natural
operations. Of which sort is, to digest that which we have eaten,
without thinking of it, to breathe in our sleep not thinking what we do.
For even in living creatures the love of life proceedeth not from the
will of the soul, but from the principles of nature. For the will many
times embraceth death upon urgent occasions, which nature abhorreth; and
contrariwise the act of generation, by which alone the continuance of
mortal things is maintained, is sometimes bridled by the will, though
nature doth always desire it. So true it is that this self-love
proceedeth not from any voluntary motion, but from natural intention.
For providence gave to her creatures this as the greatest cause of
continuance, that they naturally desire to continue so long as they may,
wherefore there is no cause why thou shouldst any way doubt that all
things which are desire naturally stability of remaining, and eschew
corruption."

"I confess," quoth I, "that I now see undoubtedly that which before
seemed very doubtful." "Now that," quoth she, "which desireth to
continue and remain seeketh to have unity. For if this be taken away,
being itself cannot remain." "It is true," quoth I. "All things then,"
quoth she, "desire unity." I granted it to be so. "But we have showed
that unity is the same as goodness." "You have indeed." "All things then
desire goodness, which thou mayest define thus: Goodness is that which
is desired of all things." "There can be nothing imagined more true. For
either all things have reference to no one principle and, being
destitute as it were of one head, shall be in confusion without any
ruler: or if there be anything to which all thin