.' Yet he could not get away from the dictum of De Grasse,
and was able to think of no better way of meeting such an attack than
awaiting it 'in a single line of battle well closed up.'

In England things were little better. In spite of the fact that at
Camperdown Duncan had actually found a sudden advantage by attacking
in two divisions, no one had been found equal to the task of working
out a tactical system to meet the inarticulate demands of the tendency
which Grenier had noticed. The possibilities even of Rodney's
manoeuvre had not been followed up, and Howe had contented himself
with his brilliant invention for increasing the impact and decision of
the single line. It was reserved for Nelson's genius to bring a
sufficiently powerful solvent to bear on the crystallised opinion of
the service, and to find a formula which would shed all that was bad
and combine all that was good in previous systems.[7]

The dominating ideas that were in his mind become clearer, if we
follow step by step all the evidence that has survived as to the
genesis and history of his memorandum. As early as 1798, when he was
hoping to intercept Bonaparte's expedition to Egypt, he had adopted a
system which was not based on the single line, and so far as is known
this was the first tactical order he ever framed as a fleet
commander. It is contained in a general order issued from the Vanguard
on June 8 of that year, and runs as follows, as though hot from the
lesson of St. Vincent: 'As it is very probable the enemy will not be
formed in regular order on the approach of the squadron under my
command, I may in that case deem it most expedient to attack them by
separate divisions. In which case the commanders of divisions are
strictly enjoined to keep their ships in the closest possible order,
and on no account whatever to risk the separation of one of their
ships.'[8] The divisional organisation follows, being his own
division of six sail and two others of four each. 'Had he fallen in
with the French fleet at sea,' wrote Captain Berry, who was sent home
with despatches after the Nile, 'that he might make the best
impression upon any part of it that should appear the most vulnerable
or the most eligible for attack, he divided his force into three
sub-squadrons [one of six sail and two of four each]. Two of these
sub-squadrons were to attack the ships of war, while the third was to
pursue the transports and to sink and destroy as many as it
could.