would be in a better plight probably
than our two van ships (now the rear), yet they would be separated and
at a distance to leeward, so as to give our ships time to refit. And
by that time I believe the battle would, from the judgment of the
admiral and captains, be over with the rest of them. Signals from
these moments are useless when every man is disposed to do his
duty. The great object is for us to support each other, and to keep
close to the enemy and to leeward of him.

If the enemy are running away, then the only signals necessary will be
to engage the enemy on arriving up with them; and the other ships to
pass on for the second, third, &c., giving if possible a close fire
into the enemy on passing, taking care to give our ships engaged
notice of your intention.

FOOTNOTES:

[1] From the original in the St. Vincent Papers. Also in Nicolas,
_Despatches and Letters_, vi. 443. Obvious mistakes in punctuation have
been corrected in the text.

[2] _Cf._ the similar remark of De Chaves, _supra_, p. 5.

_LORD NELSON_, 1805.

[+Nicolas, Despatches and Letters, vii.+[1]]

_Memorandum_.

_Secret_. Victory, off Cadiz, 9th October, 1805.

Thinking it almost impossible to bring a fleet of forty sail of the
line into line of battle in variable winds, thick weather, and other
circumstances which must occur, without such a loss of time that the
opportunity would probably be lost of bringing the enemy to battle in
such a manner as to make the business decisive; I have therefore made
up my mind to keep the fleet in that position of sailing (with the
exception of the first and second in command), that the order of
sailing is to be the order of battle; placing the fleet in two lines
of sixteen ships each, with an advance squadron of eight of the
fastest sailing two-decked ships, _which_ will always make, if
wanted, a line of twenty-four sail on whichever line the
commander-in-chief may direct.

The second in command will,[2] after _my_ intentions are made
known to him, have the entire direction of his line; to make the
attack upon the enemy, and to follow up the blow until they are
captured or destroyed.

If the enemy's fleet should be seen to windward in line of battle, and
that the two lines and the advanced squadron can fetch them,[3] they
will probably be so extended that their van could not succour their
rear.

I should therefore probably make the second in command's[4] signal,
to l