again to the windward attack, we see at once its
superficial resemblance to Nelson's, but so entirely superficial is it
that it is impossible to believe Collingwood ever penetrated the
subtleties of his great chiefs design. The dual organisation is there
and the independent divisional control, but nothing else. The advance
squadron has gone, and with it all trace of a containing
movement. There is not even the feint--the mystification of the van.
Concentration too has gone, and instead of the sound main attack on
the rear, he is most concerned with attacking the van. True, he may
have meant what Nelson meant, but if he had really grasped his fine
intention he surely must have let some hint of it escape him in his
memorandum. But for the windward attack at least there is no trace of
these things, and Nelson's masterly conception sinks in Collingwood's
hands into a mere device for expediting the old parallel attack in
single line--that is to say, the line is to be formed in bearing down
instead of waiting to bear down till the line was complete. We can
only conclude, then, that both Collingwood and Gambier could see
nothing in the 'Nelson touch' but the swift attack, the dual
organisation, and independent divisional control.
There is a third document, however, which confirms us in the
impression already formed that there were officers who saw more
deeply. It is a tactical memorandum issued by Admiral the Hon. Sir
Alexander Forrester Inglis Cochrane, Bart., G.C.B., uncle of the more
famous Earl of Dundonald. It is printed by Sir Charles Ekin, in his
_Naval Battles_, from a paper which he found at the end of a book
in his possession containing 'Additional Signals, Instructions, &c.,'
issued by Sir A.I. Cochrane to the squadron under his command upon the
Leeward Islands station.' He commanded in chief on this station from
1805 to 1814, but appears never to have been directly under Nelson's
influence except for a few weeks, when Nelson came out in pursuit of
Villeneuve and attached him to his squadron. He was rather one of
Rodney's men, under whom he had served in his last campaigns, and this
may explain the special note of his tactical system. His partiality
for Rodney's manoeuvre is obvious, and the interesting feature of his
plan of attack is the manner in which he grafts it on Nelson's system
of mutually supporting squadrons. He does not even shrink from a very
free use of doubling which his old chiefs system entailed,
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