no time gained by attacking in a line ahead,
the only reason, I could suppose, that occasioned the change.
'The advantages of an attack made in two great divisions, with a
squadron of observation, seem to combine every necessary precaution
under all circumstances.
'The power of bringing an overwhelming force against a particular
point of an enemy's fleet, so as to ensure the certain capture of the
ships attacked, and the power of condensing such a force afterwards
[so] as not only to protect the attacking ships from any offensive
attempt that may be made by the unoccupied vessels of the hostile
fleet, but also to secure the prizes already made, will most probably
lead to a victory; and if followed up according to circumstances, may
ultimately tend to the annihilation of the whole, or the greater part
of the mutilated fleet.
'Each ship may use her superiority of sailing, without being so far
removed from the inferior sailing ships as to lose their support.
'The swifter ships, passing rapidly through the enemy's fire, are less
liable to be disabled; and, after closing with their opponents, divert
their attention from the inferior sailers, who are advancing to
complete what their leaders had begun. The weather division, from
being more distant, remain spectators of the first attack for some
little time, according to the rate of the sailing; and may direct
their attack as they observe the failure or success of the first
onset, either to support the lee division, if required, or to extend
the success they may appear to have gained, &c.
'If the enemy bear up to elude the attack, the attacking fleet is well
collected for the commencement of a chase, and for mutual support in
pursuit.
'The mode of attack, adopted with such success in the Trafalgar
action, appears to me to have succeeded from the enthusiasm inspired
throughout the British fleet from their being commanded by their
beloved Nelson; from the gallant conduct of the leaders of the two
divisions; from the individual exertions of each ship after the attack
commenced, and the superior practice of the guns in the English fleet.
'It was successful also from the consternation spread through the
combined fleet on finding the British so much stronger than was
expected; from the astonishing and rapid destruction which followed
the attack of the leaders, witnessed by the whole of the hostile
fleets, inspiring the one and dispiriting the other and from the loss
o
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