f the admiral's ship early in the action.

'The disadvantages of this mode of attack appear to consist in
bringing forward the attacking force in a manner so leisurely and
alternately, that an enemy of equal spirit and equal ability in
seamanship and gunnery would have annihilated the ships one after
another in detail, carried slowly on as they were by a heavy swell and
light airs.

'At the distance of one mile five ships, at half a cable's length
apart, might direct their broadsides effectively against the head of
the division for seven minutes, supposing the rate of sailing to have
been four miles an hour; and within the distance of half a mile three
ships would do the same for seven minutes more, before the attacking
ship could fire a gun in her defence.

'It is to be observed that, although the hull of the headmost ship
does certainly in a great measure cover the hulls of those astern, yet
great injury is done to the masts and yards of the whole by the fire
directed against the leader; and that, if these ships are foiled in
their attempt to cut through the enemy's line, or to run on board of
them, they are placed, for the most part, _hors de combat_ for
the rest of the action.

'Or should it fall calm, or the wind materially decrease about the
moment of attack, the van ships must be sacrificed before the rear
could possibly come to their assistance.

'In proceeding to the attack of October 21, the weather was exactly
such as might have caused this dilemma, as the sternmost ships of the
British were six or seven miles distant. By the mode of attacking in
detail, and the manner in which the combined fleet was drawn up to
receive it, instead of doubling on the enemy, the British were, on
that day, themselves doubled and trebled on; and the advantage of
applying an overwhelming force collectively, it would seem, was
totally lost.

'The Victory, Temeraire, Sovereign, Belleisle, Mars, Colossus
and Bellerophon were placed in such situations in the onset, that
nothing but the most heroic gallantry and practical skill at their
guns could have extricated them. If the enemy's vessels had closed up
as they ought to have done, _from van to rear_, and had possessed
a nearer equality in active courage, it is my opinion that even
British skill and British gallantry could not have availed. The
position of the combined fleet at one time was precisely that in which
the British were desirous of being placed; namely, to have par