, but that such a signal even if it had been
correctly worded should stand for Nelson's last word to the service is
almost beyond belief. The final outcome of Nelson's genius for tactics
lay of course in his memorandum, and not in the form of attack he
actually adopted. Yet this remarkable signal ignores the whole
principle of the memorandum. The fundamental ideas of concentration
and containing by independent squadrons are wholly missed; and not
only this. It distorts Nelson's lee attack into a weather attack, and
holds up for imitation every vice of the reckless movement in spite of
which Nelson had triumphed. Not a word is said of its dangers, not a
word of the exceptional circumstances that alone could justify it, not
a word of how easily the tables could be turned upon a man who a
second time dared to fling to the winds every principle of his art. It
is the last word of British sailing tactics, and surely nothing in
their whole history, not even in the worst days of the old Fighting
Instructions, so staggers us with its lack of tactical sense.[8]
FOOTNOTES:
[1] _I.e._ the Instructions of 1799, _supra_, p. 278. For Signal 27
see p. 255.
[2] 'To attack on bearing indicated.'
[3] In Ekin's text the punctuation of this sentence is obviously wrong
and destroys the sense. It should accord, as I have ventured to amend
it, with that of the previous paragraph.
[4] Signal 109, 'To close nearer the ship or ships indicated.'
[5] Sir Charles Elkin adds, 'In the same work he has also a signal
(No. 785) under the head "Enemy" to "Lay on board," with the following
observation:--
'"N.B.--This signal is not meant that your people should board the enemy
unless you should find advantage by so doing; but it is that you should
run your ship on board the enemy, so as to disable her from getting
away."'
[6] Mathieu-Dumas, _Precis des Evenements Militaires: Pieces
Justificatives_, vol. xiv. p. 408.
[7] Fernandez Duro, _Armada Espanola_, viii. 353.
[8] The anonymous veteran of the old French navy, cited by
Mathieu-Dumas, explains exactly how Villeneuve might have turned the
tables on Nelson by forming two lines himself. 'There is,' he concludes,
'no known precedent of a defensive formation in two lines; but I will
venture to assert that if Admiral Villeneuve had doubled his line at the
moment he saw Nelson meant to attack him in two lines, that admiral
would never have had the imprudence of making such an
attack.'--_
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