e of battle; but from
the information I obtained after the action, connected with some
documents found on board the Bucentaur, I believe it was the intention
to have formed a line ahead, consisting of twenty-one sail--the
supposed force of the British fleet--and a squadron of observation
composed of twelve sail of the line, under Admiral Gravina, intended
to act according to circumstances after the British fleet were
engaged. By wearing together, the enemy's line became inverted, and
the light squadron which had been advanced in the van on the starboard
tack, was left in the rear after wearing; and the ships were
subsequently mingled with the rear of the main body. The wind being
light, with a heavy swell, and the fleet lying with their main
topsails to the mast, it was impossible for the ships to preserve
their exact station in the line; consequently scarce any ship was
immediately ahead or astern of her second. The fleet had then the
appearance, generally, of having formed in two lines, thus: so that
the ship to leeward seemed to be opposite the space left between two
in the weather-line.

[Illustration]

'In the rear, the line was in some places trebled; and this
particularly happened where the Colossus was, who, after passing the
stern of the French Swiftsure, and luffing up under the lee of the
Bahama, supposing herself to leeward of the enemy's line, unexpectedly
ran alongside of the French Achille under cover of the smoke. The
Colossus was then placed between the Achille and the Bahama, being on
board of the latter; and was also exposed to the fire of the
Swiftsure's after-guns. All these positions I believe to have been
merely accidental; and to accident alone I attribute the concave
circle of the fleet, or crescent line of battle. The wind shifted to
the westward as the morning advanced; and of course the enemy's ships
came up with the wind, forming a bow and quarter line. The ships were
therefore obliged to edge away, to keep in the wake of their leaders;
and this manoeuvre, from the lightness of the wind, the unmanageable
state of the ships in a heavy swell, and, we may add, the inexperience
of the enemy, not being performed with facility and celerity,
undesignedly threw the combined fleets into a position, perhaps the
best that could have been planned, had it been supported by the
skilful manoeuvring of individual ships, and with efficient practice
in gunnery.

'Of the advantages and disadvantages of th