on, on December 17, 1805, had sent to his government a
thoughtful criticism of the action, and his view of Nelson's attack
was this: 'Nothing,' he says, 'is more seamanlike or better tactics
than for a fleet which is well to windward of another to bear down
upon it in separate columns, and deploy at gun-shot from the enemy
into a line which, as it comes into action, will inflict at least as
much damage upon them as it is likely to suffer. But Admiral Nelson
did not deploy his columns at gun-shot from our line, but ran up
within pistol-shot and broke through it, so as to reduce the battle to
a series of single-ship actions. It was a manoeuvre in which I do not
think he will find many imitators. Where two fleets are equally well
trained, that which attacks in this manner must be defeated.'[7]
So it was our enemies rightly read the lesson of Trafalgar. The false
deductions therefore which grew up in our own service are all the more
extraordinary, even as we find them in the new instructions and the
current talk of the quarter-deck. But this is not the worst. It is not
till we turn to the Signal Book itself that we get a full impression
of the extent to which tactical thought had degenerated and Nelson's
seed had been choked. The movements and formations for which signals
are provided are stubbornly on the old lines of 1799. The influence of
Nelson, however, is seen in two places. The first is a group of
signals for 'attacking the enemy at anchor by passing either outside
them or between them and the land,' and for 'anchoring and engaging
either within or outside the enemy.' Here we have a rational
embodiment of the experience of the Nile. The second is a similar
attempt to embody the teaching of Trafalgar, and the way it is done
finally confirms the failure to understand what Nelson meant. So
extraordinary is the signification of the signal and its explanatory
note that it must be given in full.
'_Signal_.--Cut the enemy's line in the order of sailing in two
columns.
_'Explanatory Note_.--The admiral will make known what number of
ships from the van ship of the enemy the weather division is to break
through the enemy's line, and the same from the rear at which the lee
division is to break through their line.
'To execute this signal the fleet is to form in the order of sailing
in two columns, should it not be so formed already; the leader of each
column steering down for the position pointed out where he is to cut
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