emorandum. The 'advanced
squadron' is absent, and the order is based on two equal divisions
only.
Then on October 9, after Calder had gone, there is this entry in
Nelson's private diary: 'Sent Admiral Collingwood the Nelson touch.'
It was enclosed in a letter in which Nelson says: 'I send you my Plan
of Attack, as far as a man dare venture to guess at the very uncertain
position the enemy may be found in. But, my dear friend, it is to
place you perfectly at your ease respecting my intentions and to give
full scope to your judgment for carrying them into effect.' The same
day Collingwood replies, 'I have a just sense of your lordship's
kindness to me, and the full confidence you have reposed in me
inspires me with the most lively gratitude. I hope it will not be long
before there is an opportunity of showing your lordship that it has
not been misplaced.' On these two letters there can be little doubt
that the 'Plan of Attack' which Nelson enclosed was that of the
memorandum. The draft from which Nicolas printed appears to have been
dated October 9, and originally had in one passage 'you' and 'your'
for the 'second in command,' showing that Nelson in his mind was
addressing his remarks to Collingwood, though subsequently he altered
the sentence into the third person. Only one other copy was known to
Nicolas, and that was issued in the altered form to Captain Hope, of
the Defence, a ship which in the order of battle was in Collingwood s
squadron, but Codrington tells us it was certainly issued to all the
captains.[19]
So far, then, we have the case thus--that whatever Nelson may have
really told Lord Sidmouth, and whatever may have been in his mind when
he drew up the dual order of battle and sailing, he had by October 9
reverted to the triple idea which he had explained to Keats. Meanwhile,
however, his conception had ripened. There are marked changes in
organisation, method and intention. In organisation the reserve
squadron is reduced from the original twelve or fourteen to eight, or
one fifth of his hypothetical fleet instead of about one third--reduced,
that is, to a strength at which it was much less capable of important
independent action. In method we have, instead of an attack with the
two main divisions, an attack with one only, with the other covering
it. In intention we have as the primary function of the reserve
squadron, its attachment to one or other of the other two main
divisions as circumstances may
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