presumably largely inspired by his father, who lived
till 1835. In his view there was 'an entire alteration both of the
scientific principle and of the tactical movements,' both of which he
thinks were due to what he calls the _morale_ of the enemy's
attitude--that is, that Nelson was afraid they were going to slip
through his fingers into Cadiz. The change of plan--meaning presumably
the change from the triple to the dual organisation--he thinks was not
due to the reduced numbers which Nelson actually had under his flag,
for the ratio between the two fleets remained much about the same as
that of his hypothesis.
The interesting testimony of Lieutenant G.L. Browne, who, as Admiral
Jackson informs us, was assistant flag-lieutenant in the Victory and
had every means of knowing, endorses the view of the Moorsoms.[21]
After explaining to his parents the delay caused by the established
method of forming the fleets in two parallel lines so that each had an
opposite number, as set forth in the opening words of the memorandum,
he says, 'but by his lordship's mode of attack you will clearly
perceive not an instant of time could be lost. The frequent
communications he had with his admirals and captains put them in
possession of all his plans, so that his mode of attack was well known
to every officer of the fleet. Some will not fail to attribute
rashness to the conduct of Lord Nelson. But he well considered the
importance of a decisive naval victory at this time, and has
frequently said since we left England that, should he be so fortunate
as to fall in with the enemy, a total defeat should be the result on
the one side or the other.'
Next we have what is probably the most acute and illuminating
criticism of the battle that exists, from the pen of 'an officer who
was present.' Sir Charles Ekin quotes it anonymously; but from
internal evidence there is little difficulty in assigning it to an
officer of the Conqueror, though clearly not her captain, Israel
Pellew, in whose justification the concluding part was written.
Whoever he was the writer thoroughly appreciated and understood the
tactical basis of Nelson's plan, as laid down in the memorandum, and
he frankly condemns his chief for having exposed his fleet
unnecessarily by permitting himself to be hurried out of delivering
his attack in line abreast as he intended. It might well have been
done, so far as he could see, without any more loss of time than
actually occurred
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