say he intended a real attack. The point perhaps can
never be decided with absolute certainty, but it is this very
uncertainty that brings out the true merit and the real lesson of
Nelson's attack. As we now may gather from his captains' opinions, its
true merit was not that he threw his whole fleet on part of a superior
enemy--that was a commonplace in tactics. It was not concentration on
the rear, for that also was old; and what is more, as the attack was
delivered, so far from Nelson concentrating, he boldly, almost
recklessly, exposed himself for a strategical object to what should
have been an overwhelming concentration on the leading ships of his
two columns. The true merit of it above all previous methods of
concentration and containing was that, whether, as planned or as
delivered, it prevented the enemy from knowing on which part of their
line Nelson intended to throw his squadron, just as we are prevented
from knowing to this day. 'They won't know what I am about' were his
words to Keats.
The point is clearer still when we compare the different ways in which
Nelson and Collingwood brought their respective columns into
action. Collingwood in his Journal says that shortly before 11
o'clock, that is, an hour before getting into action, he signalled
'for the lee division to form the larboard line of bearing.' The
effect and intention of this would be that each ship in his division
would head on the shortest course to break the enemy's line in all
parts. It was the necessary signal for enabling him to carry out
regularly Howe's manoeuvre upon the enemy's rear, and his object was
declared for all to see.[37] Nelson, on the other hand, made no such
signal, but held on in line ahead, giving no indication of whether he
intended to perform the manoeuvre on the van or the centre, or whether
he meant to cut the line in line ahead. Until they knew which it was
to be, it was impossible for the enemy to take any step to concentrate
with either division, and thus Nelson held them both immobile while
Collingwood flung himself on his declared objective.
Nothing could be finer as a piece of subtle tactics. Nothing could be
more daring as a well-judged risk. The risk was indeed enormous,
perhaps the greatest ever taken at sea. Hawke risked much at Quiberon,
and much was risked at the Nile. But both were sea-risks of the class
to which our seamen were enured. At Trafalgar it was a pure
battle-risk--a mad, perpendicular attack
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