written by a
French naval officer called Parisot.
[36] Jurien de la Graviere, _Guerres Maritimes_, ii. 220, note.
[37] This highly important signal appears to have been generally
overlooked in accounts of the action. Yet Collingwood's journal is so
precise about signals that there can be no doubt he made it. Agamemnon
in Nelson's column answered it under the impression it was general. Her
log says, 'Answered signal No. 50'--that is, 'To keep on the larboard
line of bearing though then on the starboard tack. Ditto starboard
bearing if on larboard tack.' Captain Moorsom also says, 'My station was
sixth ship in the rear of the lee column; but as the Revenge sailed well
Admiral Collingwood made my signal to keep a line of bearing from him
which made me one of the leading ships through the enemy's line.' No
other ship records the signal. Probably few saw it, for in the
memorandum which Collingwood issued two years later he lays stress on
the importance of captains being particularly watchful for the signals
of their divisional commander. See _post_, pp. 324 and 329.
[38] Collingwood to Marsden, October 22. same to Parker, November 1.
Same to Pasley, December 16, 1805.
[39] See _supra_, p. 119. Villeneuve saw this. In his official despatch
from the Euryalus, November 5, he says 'Notre formation s'effectuait
avec beaucoup de peine; mais dans le genre d'attaque que je prevoyais
que l'ennemi allait nous faire, cette irregularite meme dans notre ligne
ne me paraissait pas un inconvenient.'--Jurien de la Graviere, _Guerres
Maritimes_, ii. 384.
_LORD NELSON_, 1803.
[+Clarke and McArthur, Life of Nelson, ii. 427+.[1]]
_Plan of Attack_.
The business of a commander-in-chief being first to bring an enemy's
fleet to battle on the most advantageous terms to himself (I mean that
of laying his ships close on board the enemy, as expeditiously as
possible, and secondly, to continue them there without separating
until the business is decided), I am sensible beyond this object it is
not necessary that I should say a word, being fully assured that the
admirals and captains of the fleet I have the honour to command will,
knowing my precise object, that of a close and decisive battle, supply
any deficiency in my not making signals, which may, if extended beyond
those objects, either be misunderstood, or if waited for very probably
from various causes be impossible for the commander-in-chief to
make. Therefore it will only
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