in which every recognised
tactical card was in the enemy's hand. But Nelson's judgment was
right. He knew his opponent's lack of decision, he knew the individual
shortcomings of the allied ships, and he knew he had only to throw
dust, as he did, in their eyes for the wild scheme to succeed. As
Jurien de la Graviere has most wisely said 'Le genie de Nelson
c'est d'avoir compris notre faiblesse.'

Yet when all is said, when even full weight is given to the
strategical pressure of the hour and the uncertainty of the weather,
there still remains the unanswerable criticism of the officer of the
Conqueror: that by an error of judgment Nelson spoilt his attack by
unnecessary haste. The moral advantage of pushing home a bold attack
before an enemy is formed is of course very great; but in this case
the enemy had no intention of avoiding him, as they showed, and he
acknowledged, when they boldly lay-to to accept action. The confusion
of their line was tactically no weakness: it only resulted in a
duplication which was so nicely adapted for meeting Howe's manoeuvre
that there was a widespread belief in the British fleet, which
Collingwood himself shared, that Villeneuve had adopted it
deliberately.[38] Seeing what the enemy's accidental formation was,
every ship that pierced it must be almost inevitably doubled or
trebled on. It was, we know, the old Dutch manner of meeting the
English method of attack in the earliest days of the line.[39] Had he
given Villeneuve time for forming his line properly the enemy's battle
order would have been only the weaker. Had he taken time to form his
own order the mass of the attack would have been delivered little
later than it was, its impact would have been intensified, and the
victory might well have been even more decisive than it was, while the
sacrifice it cost would certainly have been less, incalculably less,
if we think that the sacrifice included Nelson himself.

FOOTNOTES:

[1] _Nelson's Letters and Despatches_, p. 382.

[2] Nicolas, _Nelson's Despatches_, v. 287, note. It is also given in
vol. vii. p. ccxvi, apparently from a captain's copy which is undated.

[3] _Ibid._ v. 283.

[4] Professor Laughton pointed out (_op. cit._) that the conditions
will fit June to August 1804, but that it might have been 'earlier,
certainly not later.'

[5] It is very doubtful whether this formation was ever intended for
anything but tactical exercises. Morogues has a similar signal and
ins