to the rearmost ship. He does not say, however, that this
was to be 'the whole impression' of the intended attack from
to-windward. 'The whole impression' there appears to be for
Collingwood to overpower the rear while Nelson with the other two
divisions made play with the enemy's van and centre; but the
particular manner in which he would carry out this part of the design
is left undetermined.
The important point, then, in considering the relation between the
actual battle and the memorandum, is to remember that it provided for
two different methods of attacking the rear according to whether the
enemy were encountered to windward or to leeward. The somewhat
illogical arrangement of the memorandum tends to conceal this highly
important distinction. For Nelson interpolates between his explanation
of the windward attack and his opening enunciation of principle his
explanation of the leeward attack, to which the enunciation did not
apply. That some confusion was caused in the minds of some even of his
best officers is certain, but let them speak for themselves.
After the battle Captain Harvey, of the Temeraire, whom Nelson
had intended to lead his line, wrote to his wife, 'It was noon before
the action commenced, which was done according to the instructions
given us by Lord Nelson.... Lord Nelson had given me leave to lead and
break through the line about the fourteenth ship,' _i.e._ two or
three ships ahead of the centre, as explained in the memorandum for
the leeward attack but not for the windward.
On the other hand we have Captain Moorsom, of the Revenge, who was in
Collingwood's division, saying exactly the opposite. Writing to his
father on December 4, he says, 'I have seen several plans of the
action, but none to answer my ideas of it. A regular plan was laid
down by Lord Nelson some time before the action but not acted on. His
great anxiety seemed to be to get to leeward of them lest they should
make off to Cadiz before he could get near them.' And on November 1,
to the same correspondent he had written, 'I am not certain that our
mode of attack was the best: however, it succeeded.' Here then we have
two of Nelson's most able captains entirely disagreeing as to whether
or not the attack was carried out in accordance with any plan which
Nelson laid down.
Captain Moorsom's view may be further followed in a tactical study
written by his son, Vice-Admiral Constantine Moorsom.[20] His remarks
on Trafalgar were
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