dictate.

The natural inference from these important changes is that Nelson's
conception was now an attack in two divisions of different strength,
the stronger of which, as the memorandum subsequently explains, was to
be used as a containing force to cover the attack of the other, and
except that the balance of the two divisions was reversed, this is
practically just what Clerk of Eldin had recommended and what actually
happened in the battle. It is a clear advance upon the original idea
as explained to Keats, in which the third squadron was to be used on
the primitive and indefinite plan of De Chaves and Lord Lisle as a
general reserve. It also explains Nelson's covering letter to
Collingwood, in which he seems to convey to his colleague that the
pith of his plan was an attack in two divisions, and, within the
general lines of the design, complete freedom of action for the second
in command. How largely this idea of independent control entered into
the 'Nelson touch' we may judge from the fact that it is emphasised in
no less than three distinct paragraphs of the memorandum.

Such, then, is the fundamental principle of the memorandum as
enunciated in its opening paragraphs. He then proceeds to elaborate
it in two detailed plans of attack--one from to-leeward and the other
from to-windward. It was the latter he meant to make if possible. He
calls it 'the intended attack,' and it accords with the opening
enunciation. The organisation is triple, but no special function is
assigned to the reserve squadron. The actual attack on the enemy's
rear is to be made by Collingwood, while Nelson with his own division
and the reserve is to cover him. In the event of an attack having to
be made from to-leeward, the idea is different. Here the containing
movement practically disappears. The fleet is still to attack the rear
and part of the centre of the enemy, but now in three independent
divisions simultaneously, in such a way as to cut his line at three
points, and to concentrate a superior force on each section of the
severed line. To none of the divisions is assigned the duty of
containing the rest of the enemy's fleet from the outset. It is to be
dealt with at a second stage of the action by all ships that are still
capable of renewing the engagement after the first stage. 'The whole
impression,' as Nelson put it, in case he was forced to attack from
to-leeward, was to overpower the enemy's line from a little ahead of
the centre