e Northern
purpose. This threw the burden of striking the first blow upon the
South; if Southern threats were now made good, civil war seemed
inevitable, and there could be no peaceful decision of the quarrel.
The reinforcements did not arrive in time. Fort Sumter, after a day and
a half of dogged fighting, was surrendered to the enemy on April 13--for
as an enemy in arms the South now stood. The fall of Sumter changed, as
in a moment, the whole attitude of the Northern people. There was now a
nearly unanimous cry for the preservation of the Union _by force_. Yet
Seward still clung, privately, to his belief that even now the "sober
second thought" of the South would offer a way out toward reunion
without war. In official utterances and acts he was apparently in
complete harmony with the popular will to reconquer the South. Davis'
proclamation on marque and privateering, of April 17, was answered by
the Lincoln blockade proclamation of April 19. But Virginia had not yet
officially seceded, and until this occurred there seemed to Seward at
least one last straw of conciliation available. In this situation
Schleiden, Minister for Bremen, came to Seward on the morning of April
24 and offered his services as a mediator[204].
Schleiden's idea was that an armistice be agreed upon with the South
until the Northern Congress should meet in July, thus giving a breathing
spell and permitting saner second judgment to both sides. He had
consulted with his Prussian colleague, who approved, and he found Seward
favourable to the plan. Alexander H. Stephens, Vice-President of the
Confederacy, was then at Richmond, and to him, as an old friend,
Schleiden proposed to go and make the same appeal. Seward at once took
Schleiden to see Lincoln. The three men, with Chase (and the Prussian
Minister) were the only ones in the secret. Lincoln's first comment was
that he was "willing to make an attempt of contributing to the
prevention of bloodshed and regretted that Schleiden had not gone to
Richmond without consulting him or Seward." Lincoln further stated that
"he did not have in mind any aggression against the Southern States, but
merely the safety of the Government in the Capitol and the possibility
to govern everywhere," a concluding phrase that should have enlightened
Schleiden as to Lincoln's determination to preserve the Union. Lincoln
said he could neither authorize negotiations nor invite proposals, but
that he would gladly consider an
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