from his foreign war policy he now would have received strong public
support in it. But he made no effort to utilize public excitement to his
own advantage in the Cabinet. In England, Adams was able to report on
June 14 that Russell had no intention of holding further interviews with
the Southern Commissioners[227], but before anyone in Washington could
learn of this there was general knowledge of a changed tone from the
Secretary of State, and Lyons' fears were considerably allayed. On June
15, occurred that interview between Seward, Lyons, and Mercier, in which
Seward had positively refused to receive the Queen's Proclamation, but
had throughout evinced the greatest courtesy and goodwill. Lyons so
reported the conversation[228]. June 15 may, in fact, be taken as the
date when Lyons ceased to be alarmed over an immediate war. Possibly he
found it a little difficult to report so sudden a shift from stormy to
fair weather. June 21, he wrote that the "lull" was still
continuing[229]. June 24, he at last learned and described at length the
details of Lincoln's alteration of Despatch No. 10[230]. He did not
know the exact date but he expressed the opinion that "a month or three
weeks ago" war was very near--a misjudgment, since it should be
remembered that war seemed advisable to one man only--Seward; and that
on this issue he had been definitely cast down from his self-assumed
leadership into the ranks of Lincoln's lieutenants.
Lyons was, then, nearly a month behindhand in exact knowledge of
American foreign policy toward England, and he was in error in thinking
that an American attack on England was either imminent or intended.
Nevertheless, he surely was excusable, considering Seward's prestige and
Lincoln's lack of it, in reporting as he did. It was long, indeed,
before he could escape from suspicion of Seward's purposes, though
dropping, abruptly, further comment on the chances of war. A month
later, on July 20, he wrote that Seward had himself asked for a
confidential and unofficial interview, in order to make clear that there
never had been any intention of stirring agitation against England.
Personally, Seward took credit for avoiding trouble "by refusing to take
official cognizance of the recognition [by England] of the belligerent
rights of the South," and he asked Lyons to explain to Russell that
previous strong language was intended merely to make foreign Powers
understand the intensity of Northern feeling[231]
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