obtained an interview at Pembroke Lodge at noon of
Saturday, May 18, and according to Russell's report of May
21, said that the United States were 'disposed to adhere to
the Declaration of Paris,' Russell evaded the offer, saying
that he had already sent sufficient instructions to Lyons,
although the instructions were not sufficient, nor had they
been sent. When this evasion was afterward brought to his
notice by Adams, Russell, revising his report to Lyons, made
such changes in it as should represent the first proposal as
coming from himself, and the evasion to have come from Adams.
When at last obliged to read the American offer, Russell
declared that he had never heard of it before, although he
had himself reported it to Lyons and Lyons had reported it to
him. When compelled to take the offer for consideration,
Russell, though always professing to welcome adhesion pure
and simple, required the co-operation of Dayton. When Adams
overcame this last obstacle, Russell interposed a written
proviso, which as he knew from Lyons would prevent
ratification. When Adams paid no attention to the proviso but
insisted on signature of the treaty, Russell at last wrote a
declaration in the nature of an insult, which could not be
disregarded[254]."

In this presentation of the case to the jury certain minor points are
insisted upon to establish a ground for suspicion--as the question of
who first made the proposal--that are not essential to Henry Adams'
conclusions. This conclusion is that "From the delays interposed by
Russell, Adams must conclude that the British Cabinet was trying one
device after another to evade the proposition; and finally, from the
written declaration of August 19, he could draw no other inference than
that Russell had resorted to the only defensive weapon left to him, in
order to avoid the avowal of his true motives and policy[255]." The
_motive_ of this tortuous proceeding, the author believed to have been a
deep-laid scheme to revive, _after_ the American War was ended, the
earlier international practice of Great Britain, in treating as subject
to belligerent seizure enemy's goods under the neutral flag. It was the
American stand, argues Henry Adams, that in 1854 had compelled Great
Britain to renounce this practice. A complete American adherence, now,
to the Declaration, would for ever tie Britain's h