lomatic defiance of foreign intervention. Since
Great Britain had taken no part in the French scheme--a point which
Seward was careful to make clear to Dayton--the despatch needs no
expanded treatment here. Its significance is that when reported to Lyons
by Mercier (for Seward had read it to the latter) the British Minister
could pride himself on having already pointed out to both Mercier and
Russell that Seward's line was exactly that which he had prophesied.
Mercier again was very anxious that his confidences to Lyons should not
become known, and Lyons was glad indeed to be wholly free from any share
in the discussion[397].
Two days after thus describing events, Lyons, on November 6, had still
another communication, and apparently a last on this topic, with
Mercier, in which the two men again went over the whole ground of
national policy toward America, and in which their divergent views
became very apparent. The arguments were the same, but expressed with
more vigour. Mercier seems, indeed, to have attempted to "rush" Lyons
into acquiescence in his policy. Lyons finally observed to him that he
"had no reason to suppose that Her Majesty's Government considered the
time was come for entertaining at all the question of recognizing the
South" and asked what good such a step would do anyway. Mercier replied
that he did not believe that the North would declare war, and so it
would be a step toward settlement. To this Lyons took positive
exception[398]. Lyons' report of this conversation was written on
November 8, a date which was soon to stand out as that on which occurred
an event more immediately threatening to British-American relations than
any other during the Civil War.
The battle of Bull Run had left on British minds an impression of
Northern incapacity in war--even a doubt of Northern courage and
determination. On August 19 the Declaration of Paris negotiation, a
favourable result from which was eagerly desired by Russell, had failed,
as he well knew when he attached to the convention that explanatory
statement limiting its action in point of time. In the end Russell felt
that Britain had just escaped a "trap." Two weeks after this Russell
learned of the arrest of Mure, and soon of the demand for Bunch's
recall, finally and formally made by Adams on November 21. Just six days
later, on November 27, London heard of the _Trent_ affair of November 8.
It is small wonder that Russell and his colleagues felt an increa
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