ashington,
Thouvenel had told Cowley "... that the conduct pursued by Capt. Wilkes,
whether the United States claimed to be considered as Belligerents, _or
as a Government engaged in putting down a rebellion_, was a violation of
all those principles of Maritime international law, which France had
ever supported[481] ..." and had instructed Mercier to so state to
Seward. This implied a reflection on former British practice, especially
as regards the exercise of a right of search to recover its own citizens
and is indicative of the correctness of Adams' judgment that one main
reason for European support of Great Britain in the _Trent_ crisis, was
the general desire to tie her to a limitation of belligerent
maritime power.
In notifying Russell of the release of the prisoners, Lyons had stated
that he would caution the Commander of the ship conveying them that they
were "not to be received with honours or treated otherwise than as
distinguished _private_ gentlemen[482]." Russell was equally cautious,
seeing Mason, shortly after arrival in London, "unofficially at my own
house," on February 10, refusing to read his credentials, and after
listening to a statement of his instructions, replying that "nothing had
hitherto occurred which would justify or induce" Great Britain to depart
from a position of neutrality[483]. Russell had already suggested that
Thouvenel use the same method with Slidell[484]. This procedure does not
necessarily indicate a change in governmental attitude, for it is
exactly in line with that pursued toward the Confederate Commissioners
before the _Trent_; but the _Trent_ controversy might naturally have
been expected to have brought about an _easier_ relation between Russell
and a Southern representative. That it did not do so is evidence of
Russell's care not to give offence to Northern susceptibilities. Also,
in relief at the outcome of the _Trent_, he was convinced, momentarily
at least, that the general British suspicion of Seward was unfounded. "I
do not," he wrote to Gladstone, "believe that Seward has any animosity
to this country. It is all buncom" (_sic_)[485]. Apparently it was
beginning to be realized by British statesmen that Seward's "high tone"
which they had interpreted, with some justification earlier, as
especially inimical to England, now indicated a foreign policy based
upon one object only--the restoration of the Union, and that in pursuit
of this object he was but seeking to make cl
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