s[558].
England's position as the leading maritime Power made it inevitable that
she should promptly approve the Northern blockade effort and be cautious
in criticizing its legitimate operation. Both her own history and
probable future interests when a belligerent, required such a policy far
more important in the eyes of statesmen than any temporary injury to
British commerce. English merchants, if determined to trade with the
South, must take their own risks, and that Russell believed they would
do so is evidenced by his comment to Adams that it was a tradition of
the sea that Englishmen "would, if money were to be made by it, send
supplies even to hell at the risk of burning their sails."

But trade problems with the South soon brought real pressure on the
Government. In January, while marking time until Mason should arrive at
his post, the Confederate commissioners already in London very nearly
took a step that might have prejudiced the new envoy's position. They
had now learned through public documents that Russell had informed Adams
he "had no intention of seeing them again." Very angry they planned a
formal protest to the British Government, but in the end Mann and Rost
counselled silence, outvoting Yancey[559]. On his arrival Mason ignored
this situation and with cause for, warmly received socially in
pro-Southern circles, he felt confident that at least a private
reception would soon be given him by Russell. He became, indeed,
somewhat of a social lion, and mistaking this personal popularity for
evidence of parliamentary, if not governmental, attitude, was confident
of quick advantages for the South. On the day after his arrival he wrote
unofficially to Hunter, Confederate Secretary of State "... although the
Ministry may hang back in regard to the blockade and recognition through
the Queen's speech, at the opening of Parliament next week the popular
voice through the House of Commons will demand both."... "I shall be
disappointed if the Parliament does not insist on definite action by the
Ministry[560]...."

Carefully considering the situation and taking the advice of many
English friends, Mason and Slidell agreed that the best line to take was
to lay aside for the moment the claim to recognition and to urge
European repudiation of the blockade. Slidell, arrived in Paris, wrote
Mason that in his coming interview with Thouvenel he should "make only a
passing allusion to the question of recognition, intimating t