rm a barren
acquisition to the enemy, and will on our side serve only as a
stimulant[624]."

If the South needed such stimulants she was certainly getting repeated
doses in the three months from February to May, 1862. In England,
Lindsay might be hopeful of a movement by the Tory opposition, but
thought it wiser to postpone for a time further pressure in that
direction. May 8, Henry Adams could write to his brother of British
public opinion, "there is no doubt that the idea here is as strong as
ever that we must ultimately fail[625]," but on May 16, that "the effect
of the news here [of New Orleans] has been greater than anything yet ...
the _Times_ came out and gave fairly in that it had been mistaken; it
had believed Southern accounts and was deceived by them. This morning it
has an article still more remarkable and intimates for the first time
that it sees little more chance for the South. There is, we think, a
preparation for withdrawing their belligerent declaration and
acknowledging again the authority of the Federal Government over all the
national territory to be absolute and undisputed. One more victory will
bring us up to this, I am confident[626]."

This was mistaken confidence. Nor did governmental reaction keep pace
with Southern depression or Northern elation; the British Ministry was
simply made more determined to preserve strict neutrality and to
restrain its French partner in a "wait for events" policy. The "one more
victory" so eagerly desired by Henry Adams was not forthcoming, and the
attention, now all focused on McClellan's slow-moving campaign, waited
in vain for the demonstration of another and more striking evidence of
Northern power--the capture of the Confederate Capital, Richmond.
McClellan's delays coincided with a bruiting of the news at Washington
that foreign Powers were about to offer mediation. This was treated at
some length in the semi-official _National Intelligencer_ of May 16 in
an article which Lyons thought inspired by Seward, stating that
mediation would be welcome if offered for the purpose of re-union, but
would otherwise be resented, a view which Lyons thought fairly
represented the situation[627].

There can be little doubt that this Washington rumour was largely the
result of the very positive opinion held by Mercier of ultimate Southern
success and his somewhat free private communications. He may, indeed,
have been talking more freely than usual exactly because of anxie