nications. More than any other one battle of the Civil
War the duel between the _Merrimac_ and the _Monitor_ struck the
imagination of the British people, and justly so because of its
significance in relation to the power of the British Navy. It "has been
the main talk of the town," wrote Adams, "ever since the news came, in
Parliament, in the clubs, in the city, among the military and naval
people. The impression is that it dates the commencement of a new era in
warfare, and that Great Britain must consent to begin over again[587]."
The victory of the _Monitor_ was relatively unimportant in British
eyes, but a fight between two completely armoured ships, and especially
the ease with which the _Merrimac_ had vanquished wooden ships on the
day previous, were cause of anxious consideration for the future.
Russell was more concerned over the immediate lessons of the battle.
"Only think," he wrote, "of our position if in case of the Yankees
turning upon us they should by means of iron ships renew the triumphs
they achieved in 1812-13 by means of superior size and weight of
metal[588]."

This, however, was but early and hasty speculation, and while American
ingenuity and experiment in naval warfare had, indeed, sounded the
death-knell of wooden ships of war, no great change in the character of
navies was immediately possible. Moreover British shipbuilders could
surely keep pace in iron-clad construction with America or any other
nation. The success of the _Monitor_ was soon regarded by the British
Government as important mainly as indicative of a new energy in the
North promising further and more important successes on land. The
Government hoped for such Northern success not because of any belief
that these would go to the extent of forcing the South into submission,
for they were still, and for a long time to come, obsessed with the
conviction that Southern independence must ultimately be achieved. The
idea was, rather, that the North, having vindicated its fighting ability
and realizing that the South, even though losing battle after battle,
was stubborn in the will to independence, would reach the conclusion
that the game was not worth the price and would consent to separation.
Russell wrote in this vein to Lyons, even though he thought that the
"morale of the Southern army seems to be ruined for the time[589]." He
believed that the end of the war would be hastened by Northern
victories, and he therefore rejoiced in them.