ity, since the destination of the vessel was
to a neutral, not to an enemy port[416]. This opinion would have
prohibited even the carrying of the _Trent_ into an American port for
trial by a prize court.
But the British Government did not argue the matter in its demand upon
the United States. The case was one for a quick demand of prompt
reparation. Russell's instruction to Lyons, sent on November 30, was
couched in coldly correct language, showing neither a friendly nor an
unfriendly attitude. The seizure of the envoys was asserted to be a
breach of international law, which, it was hoped, had occurred without
orders, and Lyons was to demand the restoration of the prisoners with an
apology. If Seward had not already offered these terms Lyons was to
propose them, but as a preliminary step in making clear the British
position, he might read the instruction to Seward, leaving him a copy
of it if desired[417]. In another instruction of the same date Russell
authorized a delay of seven days in insisting upon an answer by Seward,
if the latter wished it, and gave Lyons liberty to determine whether
"the requirements of Her Majesty's Government are substantially complied
with[418]." And on December 1, Russell writing privately to Lyons
instructed him, while upholding English dignity, to abstain from
anything like menace[419]. On November 30, also, the Government
hurriedly sent out orders to hold the British Fleet in readiness, began
preparations for the sending of troops to Canada, and initiated
munitions and supply activities. Evidently there was at first but faint
hope that a break in relations, soon to be followed by war, was to be
avoided[420].
It has long been known to history, and was known to Adams almost
immediately, that the first draft of the instruction to Lyons was
softened in language by the advice of Prince Albert, the material point
being the expression of a hope that the action of Captain Wilkes was
unauthorized[421]. That instruction had been sent previous to the
receipt of a report from Lyons in which, very fearful of results, he
stated that, waiting instructions, he would preserve a strict
silence[422]. Equally anxious was Cowley at Paris, who feared the
realization of Seward's former "foreign war panacea." "I wish I could
divest myself of the idea that the North and South will not shake hands
over a war with us[423]." Considering the bitterness of the quarrel in
America this was a far-fetched notion. The
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