l difficulties at home of an administration
already seriously weakened by a long-continued failure to "press the
war," and it also fails to recognize that in the American Cabinet itself
a proposal by Seward to release, made immediately, would in all
probability have been negatived. Blair, in the Cabinet, and Sumner in
the Senate, were, indeed, in favour of prompt release, but Lincoln seems
to have thought the prisoners must be held, even though he feared they
might become "white elephants." All that Seward could do at first was to
notify Adams that Wilkes had acted without instructions[472].

On Christmas morning the Cabinet met to consider the answer to Great
Britain. Sumner attended and read letters from Bright and Cobden,
earnestly urging a yielding by America and depicting the strength of
British feeling. Bright wrote: "If you are resolved to succeed against
the South, _have no war with England_; make every concession that can be
made; don't even hesitate to tell the world _that you will even concede
what two years ago no Power would have asked of you_, rather than give
another nation a pretence for assisting in the breaking up of your
country[473]." Without doubt Bright's letters had great influence on
Lincoln and on other Cabinet members, greatly aiding Seward, but that
his task was difficult is shown by the fact that an entire morning's
discussion brought no conclusion. Adjournment was taken until the next
day and after another long debate Seward had the fortune to persuade his
associates to a hearty unanimity on December 26. The American reply in
the form of a communication to Lyons was presented to him by Seward on
the 27th, and on that same day Lyons forwarded it to Russell. It did not
contain an apology, but Lyons wrote that since the prisoners were to be
released and acknowledgment was made that reparation was due to Great
Britain, he considered that British demands were "so far substantially
complied with" that he should remain at his post until he received
further orders[474].

Seward's reply was immediately printed in the American papers. Lyons
reported that it was very well received and that the public was calm and
apparently contented with the outcome[475]. He thought that "thus the
preparation for war ... has prevented war." Seward's argument reviewed
at great length all the conditions of the incident, dilated on many
points of international law both relevant and irrelevant, narrated the
past relation