tting
cotton. But, in Europe, powers have often said to belligerents,
Make up your quarrels. We propose to give terms
of pacification which we think fair and equitable. If you
accept them, well and good. But, if your adversary accepts
them and you refuse them, our mediation is at an end,
and you may expect to see us your enemies. France would
be quite ready to hold this language with us.

"If such a policy were to be adopted the time for it
would be the end of the year, or immediately before the
meeting of Parliament[392]."

Apparently Russell under the irritations of the moment was somewhat
carried away by Mercier's suggestion. That it was but a briefly held
thought has been shown by expressions from him already cited[393]. Nor
was he alone in ministerial uncertainty[394], but Palmerston was not
inclined to alter British policy. October 18, he replied to Russell:

"As to North America, our best and true policy seems to
be to go on as we have begun, and to keep quite clear of the
conflict between North and South.... The only
excuse [for intervention] would be the danger to the intervening
parties if the conflict went on; but in the American
case this can not be pleaded by the Powers of Europe.

"I quite agree with you that the want of cotton would
not justify such a proceeding, unless, indeed, the distress
created by that want was far more serious than it is likely
to be. The probability is that some cotton will find its way
to us from America, and that we shall get a greater supply
than usual from other quarters.

"The only thing to do seems to be to lie on our oars
and to give no pretext to the Washingtonians to quarrel
with us, while, on the other hand, we maintain our rights
and those of our fellow countrymen[395]."

In Washington the result of Mercier's conversation with Seward,
outlining Thouvenel's suggestions, was a long and carefully prepared
despatch to Dayton, in Paris, which the biographer of Seward thinks was
one of his "great despatches; perhaps it was his greatest, if we
consider his perfect balance and the diplomatic way in which he seemed
to ignore what was menacing, while he adroitly let Thouvenel see what
the result would be if the implied threats should be carried out[396]."
Seward argued with skill the entire matter of cotton, but he was none
the less firm in dip